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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this action 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Relative to the issue of termination of alimony due to the 
cohabitation of the recipient spouse, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6) is 
determinative, which provides: 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. 
However, if it is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, payment 
of alimony shall resume. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 7, 1991, the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Summit County entered a Decree of Divorce (the "Decree") divorcing 
Carolyne Joan Sigg ("Ms. Sigg") and Henry Alfred Sigg ("Mr. Sigg") 
R. 356-366. (A photocopy of the Decree is included in the addendum 
to Ms. Sigg's brief.) 
On November 13, 1992, Mr. Sigg filed a Verified Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce (the "First Petition") R. 437-
444. Ms. Sigg filed a Counterclaim. R. 459-463. In the First 
Petition, Mr. Sigg sought, among other things, custody of the two 
minor children of the parties or for an order prohibiting Ms. Sigg 
from interfering with his visitation rights. Based on Ms. Sigg?s 
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representations that the interference would cease, on July 2, 1993, 
the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the First Petition and 
Counterclaim. R. 471-472. 
Notwithstanding Ms. Sigg's representations to not interfere 
with Mr. Sigg's visitation, the interference continued and Ms. Sigg 
began to openly cohabit. On November 24, 1993, Mr. Sigg filed 
another Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
(the "Second Petition"). R. 475-489. In the Second Petition, Mr. 
Sigg again sought custody of the minor children or for an order 
prohibiting Ms. Sigg from interfering with his visitation rights. 
In addition, Mr. Sigg sought an order terminating alimony due to 
her blatant cohabitation. 
Certain temporary orders were entered by the trial court in 
February and May 1994. R. 579-84 and 623-5. On April 24, 1994, 
the trial court set trial for June 14, 1994. R. 604-5. On June 9, 
1994, Ms. Sigg moved the trial court to continue the trial. R. 
633-4. That motion was denied. R. 653-7. Trial was held on June 
14-15, 1994, the Honorable David S. Young presiding. R. 653-7. At 
the conclusion of trial, the trial court announced its decision 
(the "Judge's Ruling"). R. 660. On September 29, 1994, the trial 
court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its 
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Amended Decree of Divorce. R. 671-7001. On October 26, 1994, Ms. 
Sigg filed her Notice of Appeal. R. 723. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ms. Sigg has failed to fairly meet the requirements of Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(7) and controlling case law that her brief marshall 
a complete statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review and to state them in the light most favorable to the 
decision of the trial court. Therefore, Mr. Sigg sets out the 
facts and evidence which are material to the review by this Court. 
Background 
1. Mr. and Ms. Sigg were married on September 8, 1984, and 
divorced on April 7, 1991. R. 356-366. 
2. The parties have two children as issue of their marriage: 
Nicola Tamara Sigg, born March 4, 1985, age 9 at the time of trial; 
and Lindsay Simone Sigg, born January 6, 1989, age 5 at the time of 
trial. T. 22.2 
3. Since the divorce of the parties, Mr. Sigg has remarried 
and lives with his new wife, Amy Wilking, and her 8 year old 
The Judge's Ruling, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and the Amended Decree of Divorce are all included in the 
addendum to Ms. Sigg's brief. 
2
 For ease of reference, citation to the trial transcript 
will be made to the page number of the transcript and denoted by 
"T. ." Other references are made to the paginated record and 
denoted by HR. 
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daughter, Katie. T. 23, 58. Nicola, Lindsay and Katie have known 
each other since they were infants, play well together and refer to 
each other as sisters. T. 23. 
4. Since the divorce of the parties, Ms. Sigg has not 
remarried and is, according to her own admission, currently 
cohabiting with Victor Haynes ("Mr. Haynes") in Colorado. T. 222. 
The Decree 
5. Pursuant to the terms of the Decree: 
a. Ms. Sigg was awarded custody of the two children of 
the parties. Mr. Sigg was awarded reasonable rights of 
visitation with extended visitation of up to 60 days each year 
if Ms. Sigg resided outside the State of Utah. R. 356-66. 
b. The parties were ordered to "freely and openly 
communicate regarding actions to be taken in the best 
interests of the children." Mr. Sigg was awarded the right to 
receive and review all school, medical, dental, social and 
religious records of importance. Mr. Sigg was awarded the 
right to participate in the children's school activities 
including parent-teacher conferences and programs. The 
parties were ordered to "take no action to interfere in the 
enhancement of the other's relationship with the children, nor 
any action which may be construed in any respect as derogatory 
toward the other parent in that relationship." R. 356-66. 
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Interference With Visitation And Noncompliance With The Decree 
6* Ms. Sigg took deliberate and malicious steps to interfere 
with and preclude Mr. Sigg's visitation with the minor children as 
noted below. 
7. Mr. Sigg had no visitation with the minor children during 
Christmas in 1992 or 1993; Thanksgiving in 1991, 1992 or 1993; or 
Father's Day in 1991, 1992 or 1993. T. 25-29. 
8* From August 1992 through February 1993, Mr. Sigg had a 
total of two hours of visitation supervised by Ms. Sigg's father 
while he was in New Zealand. T. 30. 
9. Mr. Sigg was required to attempt telephone visitation 
with the minor children through a business telephone number and 
answering machine of Mr. Haynes. T. 35-7. 
10. Mr. Sigg experienced only unilateral communication and 
decision making by Ms. Sigg relative to visitation and the 
interests of the minor children. Typically, Ms. Sigg refused to 
communicate with Mr. Sigg regarding those issues and at the time of 
trial, had refused to speak with Mr. Sigg for over one year. T. 
31, 42. 
11. Ms. Sigg refused to provide or tardily provided Mr. Sigg 
limited information and documents regarding the educational and 
health concerns of the minor children. T. 31-3. 
5 
12. During the spring and summer of 1992, while Ms. Sigg was 
in the process of selling her residence, she did not advise Mr. 
Sigg that she planned to permanently relocate from the Park City 
area with the minor children, that she was going to Boulder, 
Colorado to stay with Mr. Haynes, or that she intended to 
permanently relocate to New Zealand. Ms. Sigg, in fact, misled Mr. 
Sigg by requesting that he terminate his visitation early during 
the summer of 1992 under the guise that she wanted to take the 
children to Disneyland. Further, she failed to make any 
arrangements for the parties' children to visit with Mr. Sigg while 
she was out of the State of Utah. T. 29-30, 47-48. 
13. In August 1992, Ms. Sigg traveled to New Zealand with the 
parties' minor children and stayed at her parents' residence. Mr. 
Sigg eventually found out that Ms. Sigg had traveled to New Zealand 
and spoke with her by telephone within minutes of her arrival. Mr. 
Sigg's subsequent telephone calls to learn of the whereabouts of 
his children were either not accepted or no information about the 
children was given by Ms. Sigg or her parents to Mr. Sigg. T. 38-
40. 
14. While in New Zealand, Ms. Sigg moved from her parents 
home to a friend's home, but she did not provide Mr. Sigg with a 
telephone number or other information so that visitation could be 
arranged. Similarly, Ms. Sigg's parents would not provide Mr. Sigg 
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with a telephone number or other information about the whereabouts 
of Ms. Sigg or the minor children. Neither Ms. Sigg nor her 
parents were candid or forthcoming in providing information. T. 
40-41. 
15. Mr. Sigg hired a private detective to locate his children 
and traveled to New Zealand where he remained for a period of 
approximately five weeks. Mr. Sigg hired counsel and instituted a 
proceeding in New Zealand to secure visitation with and custody of 
his children. The New Zealand court found that Ms. Sigg had not 
violated the Decree for the reason that insufficient time had 
elapsed to establish whether Ms. Sigg would permit 60 days of 
visitation within the one year period of her having left the State 
of Utah during the summer of 1992. While mediation was attempted, 
Mr. Sigg, in the entire five week period while in New Zealand, saw 
his children on only one occasion in the presence of Ms. Sigg and 
Ms. Sigg?s father for a period of less than two hours even though 
requests for visitation alone with his children were continuously 
made by Mr. Sigg. Mr. Sigg incurred substantial transportation 
costs to travel to New Zealand and also incurred private 
investigator fees, attorneys' fees and mediator fees. T. 40-46, 
48. 
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16. Mr. Hayes traveled to New Zealand and stayed with Ms. 
Sigg for approximately two weeks in December 1992. Ms. Sigg and 
Mr. Hayes slept together and had sexual intercourse. T. 326. 
17. Ms. Sigg returned from New Zealand to Boulder, Colorado 
on February 7, 1993. T. 255. For approximately the next two 
weeks, Ms. Sigg and the minor children lived in Mr. Haynes1 
condominium. T. 256. 
18. In an attempt to hide the cohabitation from Mr. Sigg, Ms. 
Sigg rented another condominium in the same complex. Ms. Sigg, Mr. 
Haynes and the minor children continued to eat together; Ms. Sigg 
and Mr. Haynes slept together and had sexual intercourse; Ms. Sigg 
and Mr. Haynes had free access to or a key to each condominium; Ms. 
Sigg and Mr. Haynes shared certain living expenses; Mr. Sigg was 
required to place telephone calls for telephone visitation with the 
minor children to Mr. Haynes1 business telephone number; Ms. Sigg 
and Mr. Haynes maintained certain clothing in each condominium; the 
furniture in both condominiums was used by Mr. Haynes and Ms. Sigg. 
T. 223-235. 
19. Mr. Sigg was only given the business telephone number 
through which he could contact his children. Mr. Sigg became 
frustrated and angry when his calls met with answering machine 
messages and finally instructions from Mr. Haynes that Mr. Sigg 
could only speak with his children two evenings each week at 7:00 
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p.m. Subsequently, a personal telephone line was obtained but Ms. 
Sigg was not candid or forthcoming in providing the number to Mr. 
Sigg. T. 235-37. 
20. In August 1993, Mr. Haynes and Ms. Sigg closed on the 
purchase of a residence and began to openly cohabit. T. 261. 
21. Mr. Sigg visited with the children in August 1993 on the 
east coast for a family reunion. Mr. Sigg and the minor children 
informed Ms. Sigg that he wanted an additional five days of 
visitation. Ms. Sigg should have consented to such since the 
request was reasonable and Mr. Sigg was not attempting to annoy Ms. 
Sigg. However, due to the animosity between the parties, Ms. Sigg 
refused to consent to the additional days of visitation. Mr. Sigg 
was late returning the children from time to time although he 
informed Ms. Sigg of late returns due to weather conditions, 
airplane schedules and other situations. T. 49-53. 
22. Mr. Sigg, pursuant to a pre-arranged agreement with Ms. 
Sigg, traveled to Boulder, Colorado on December 20, 1993, to visit 
with his children during the Christmas holiday between December 20 
and 30, 1993. T. 53-56. 
23. Ms. Sigg informed Mr. Sigg that he could pick up the 
children but he could do so only at a lot adjacent to a bank in 
Boulder, Colorado at 10:00 a.m. on December 20. Notwithstanding 
his objection to picking up the children in a commercial parking 
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lot, he traveled to the appointed place and when the children were 
not present at the appointed time, he called the residence of Ms. 
Sigg and Mr. Haynes from a pay telephone. T. 53-56. 
24. When there was no answer, he returned to his vehicle and 
was thereupon arrested and incarcerated based upon a telephone 
harassment complaint filed by Mr. Haynes with the knowledge of Ms. 
Sigg. T. 53-56. 
25. Ms. Sigg did not deliver the children to the appointed 
place notwithstanding her agreement to do so. Following the 
posting of bail, Mr. Sigg was denied visitation with his children 
other than in the presence of a social worker in a supervised 
situation which he declined. Mr. Sigg thereafter returned to the 
State of Utah. Mr. Sigg was required to retain and pay for counsel 
to represent him in the Colorado criminal action. T. 53-57. 
The Custody Evaluation 
26. Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D., J.D., performed an extensive 
custody evaluation. Dr. Stewart carefully considered each factor 
under Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10. After considering all of the factors, 
Dr. Stewart concluded that it was in the best interests of the 
minor children that Mr. Sigg be awarded custody. The History, 
Recommendations and Visitation sections of Dr. Stewart's evaluation 
report are included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 1. The trial 
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court adopted Dr. Stewart's report as the findings of the trial 
court. 
27. Dr. Stewart testified (T. 67-158) that she believed that 
one factor, among others, to be considered was a determination of 
which parent was most likely to act in the best interests of the 
children by allowing them frequent and continuing contact with the 
non-custodial parent. This factor, explicitly stated in Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-10(2), recognizes an overriding interest in maintaining 
a relationship with both parents. Dr. Stewart noted that Ms. 
Sigg's "pattern of interfering with visitation rather than 
facilitating it and her use of other people in this effort has 
continued for at least a year and a half and is indicative of 
ongoing problems in visitation if she remains the custodial 
parent." Recommendations, p. 8. 
28. Prior to Ms. Sigg removing the children from Park City, 
Mr. Sigg took an extremely active role in the activities of the 
children including field trips, gymnastic meets, athletic 
practices, school programs, camping, sports, movies, doctor visits, 
etc. T. 60-61, 168-171. 
29. Since the Decree was entered and while in the custody of 
Ms. Sigg, Nicola has attended four schools in Park City, New 
Zealand and two in Boulder, Colorado. T. 37-8. 
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30. Mr. Sigg has extended family in the Park City area and 
regularly participates in family activities with them. Ms. Sigg 
has no family in the Boulder, Colorado area. T. 58-9. 
31. Mr. Sigg desires to foster a healthy relationship between 
both parties and the minor children so that the best interests of 
the minor children can be fostered. T. 62-65. 
32. Lindsay Sigg, the youngest of the minor children, stated 
to Dr. Stewart her preference to live with her father and gave good 
reasons therefor, most of which related to her not caring for Mr. 
Haynes. The parties1 child Nicola was less definite in her 
preference, but expressed problems she had experienced with Mr. 
Haynes. Recommendations, p. 3. 
33. The parties' minor children are doing well in school and 
there is no reason to believe that they would not continue to 
progress and achieve in the Park City school system with which the 
parties' oldest child is familiar and in which she had been 
enrolled. Recommendations, p. 4. 
34. The children are closely bonded with each of their 
parents with the exception that tension has been created by Ms. 
Sigg because of her limiting or controlling the children's contact 
with Mr. Sigg. Mr. Sigg has made considerable sacrifices to be 
close to his children and was even willing to sell his businesses 
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and move to their domicile, if necessary, in order to be with his 
children. Recommendations, p. 4. 
35. The custody and visitation arrangements worked well 
during the first fifteen months following the parties1 divorce, but 
deteriorated steadily since Ms. Sigg departed with the children to 
Colorado and New Zealand and she failed to facilitate visitation 
with the children except on her terms which are not in their best 
interests. Recommendations, p. 1, 4. 
36. The children were born and raised in Park City, Utah, 
attended school and pre-school there and are acquainted and 
comfortable with their surroundings there. Recommendations, p. 1. 
37. The environment offered by Mr. Sigg is a stable one with 
permanent employment, a satisfactory remarriage relationship and 
extended family and friends with whom the parties1 minor children 
are acquainted. Recommendations, p. 5-7. 
38. Although Ms. Sigg has been an attentive mother who was 
not neglecting the physical needs of the minor children, and the 
minor children were generally doing well in her custody, it is in 
the best interests of the parties' minor children that custody be 
changed from Ms. Sigg to Mr. Sigg for the principal reason, among 
others, that Mr. Sigg will facilitate visitation between Ms. Sigg 
and the minor children whereas Ms. Sigg has a history of 
interfering with Mr. Sigg's visitation with the minor children. It 
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is in the best interests of the minor children that a relationship 
with both parents be fostered. The probability of a healthy 
relationship being fostered with both parents will be enhanced if 
Mr. Sigg is the custodial parent. Recommendations, p. 1-8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Ms. Sigg has substantially interfered with and precluded 
visitation between Mr. Sigg and the minor children of the parties. 
Such constitutes a substantial and material change in circumstances 
permitting modification of the Decree. 
Dr. Stewart conducted an extensive custody evaluation and 
concluded that based on the facts and circumstances of this case, 
it is in the best interest of the minor children that Mr. Sigg 
serve as custodial parent. In two days of trial, the trial court 
heard overwhelming evidence to justify Dr. Stewart's conclusions 
and recommendations. Utah law permits and the facts mandate the 
action the trial court took. 
2. The trial court found outrageous and egregious conduct on 
the part of Ms. Sigg constituting a deliberate attempt to interfere 
with and frustrate the visitation rights of Mr. Sigg. Utah law 
permits an award of attorneys' fees without a showing of financial 
need in such cases. 
3. At trial, Ms. Sigg claimed her entitlement to 
reimbursement of certain day care costs while she was employed in 
14 
the home. The trial court, in exercising its broad discretion, 
concluded it was equitable that Ms. Sigg be solely responsible for 
one-third of those costs and that the parties be equally 
responsible for the balance. 
4. Ms. Sigg admitted that she and Mr. Haynes began 
cohabiting no later than August 1993. The evidence presented at 
trial clearly established, however, that the cohabitation occurred 
no later than February 1993. The trial court also reached that 
conclusion. Accordingly, Mr. Sigg's obligation to pay alimony 
terminated as of February 1993, and he should receive credit for 
alimony amounts paid thereafter. 
5. Ms. Sigg claims that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by not granting her motion for continuance of the 
trial. The trial court's denial of that motion did not constitute 
prejudicial error. Assuming arguendo, that the denial of the 
motion caused any prejudice, the prejudice equally affected both 
parties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
MS. SIGG'S INTERFERENCE WITH AND ATTEMPT 
TO PRECLUDE VISITATION CONSTITUTES A 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING MODIFICATION OF 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The gravamen of Ms. Siggfs appeal is that the trial court: 
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made a change in permanent custody from Mrs, 
Sigg to Mr. Sigg without any factual showing 
of a change in circumstance from the 
circumstance of the original Decree of Divorce 
or poor parenting ability of Mrs. Sigg, after 
Mrs. Sigg has been the custodial parent from 
1989 to 1994. 
Motion for Stay of Order, at 23. Ms. Sigg alleges that the trial 
court's decision is "purely punitive in nature" and "clear error." 
Id. 
Under Utah law a bifurcated procedure is to be implemented by 
the trial court when considering a petition for modification of a 
custody award. In Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In the initial step, the court will receive 
evidence only as to the nature and materiality 
of any changes in those circumstances upon 
which the earlier award of custody was based. 
In this step, the party seeking modification 
must demonstrate (1) that since the time of 
the previous decree, there have been changes 
in the circumstances upon which the previous 
award was based; and (2) that those changes 
are sufficiently substantial and material to 
justify reopening the question of custody. 
Id. at 54. In Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In order to meet this threshold requirement, a 
party must show, in addition to the existence 
and extent of the change, that the change is 
Ms. Sigg's Motion for Stay of Order was filed with this 
Court and is not part of the record on appeal. This Court denied 
that motion. 
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significant In relation to the modification 
sought. The asserted change must, therefore, 
have some material relationship to and 
substantial effect on parenting ability or the 
functioning of the presently existing 
custodial relationship. In the absence of an 
indication that the change has or will have 
such effect, the materiality requirement is 
not met. Accordingly, it is not sufficient 
merely to allege a change which, although 
otherwise substantial, does not essentially 
affect the custodial relationship. 
The required showing of materiality is to be 
distinguished from the evidence that is 
appropriately presented in the second phase of 
the proceeding which the "best interests" 
analysis occurs. The materiality requirement 
is designed to help the court decide if there 
is a valid reason to reopen a question already 
settled by an earlier order, while the best 
interests analysis relates to a present and 
future readjustment of the parties1 interests. 
In other words, if the circumstances that have 
changed do not appear on their face to be the 
kind of circumstances on which an earlier 
custody decision was based, there is no valid 
reason to reconsider that decision. The 
rational is that custody placements, once 
made, should be as stable as possible unless 
the factual basis for them has completely 
changed. 
This Court has held that visitation interference "may be a 
factor relevant to the issues of both a change in circumstances and 
the child's best interests." Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990). In Smith, this Court stated: 
Modification of a custody decree must serve 
the welfare or best interests of the child. 
Elmer, 776 P.2d at 605. In determining the 
best interests of the child, the court should 
consider the policy against uprooting a child 
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from an established well-functioning 
relationship, except for compelling reasons. 
Id.; Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Consequently a substantial 
change in circumstances must be found before a 
custody decree is modified. 
The best interests of a minor child are 
promoted by having the child respect and love 
both parents. "Fostering a child' s 
relationship with the noncustodial parent has 
an important bearing on the child's best 
interest." Dana v. Dana, 789 P. 2d 726, 730 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Visitation by a 
noncustodial parent helps to develop this 
bonding of respect and love. Interference by 
the custodial parent with a noncustodial 
parent's visitation rights as ordered by the 
court may clearly be contrary to a child's 
best interests. Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 
A.D.2d 380, 402 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215-16 (1978) 
("It is readily apparent that the respondent's 
very act of preventing the [minor children] . 
. . from seeing and being with their father is 
an act so inconsistent with the best interests 
of the children as to, per se, raise a strong 
probability that the mother is unfit to act as 
custodial parent."). 
Some courts have held that, in 
appropriate cases, interference with 
visitation may justify a change in custody. 
Egle v. Egle, 715 F.2d 999, 1015 (5th Cir. 
1983); Moffat v. Moffat, 27 Cal.3d 645, 165 
Cal. Rptr. 877, 612 P.2d 967, 971 (1980); 
Lopez v. Lopez, 97 N.M. 332, 639 P.2d 1186, 
1188 (1982). Utah has not addressed the 
issue. We are persuaded, however, that 
interference with visitation may be a factor 
relevant to the issues of both a change in 
circumstances and the child's best interests. 
at 410-411. 
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In this case, Ms. Sigg's malicious, intentional and willful 
acts of preventing the minor children from seeing and visiting with 
their father constitute a substantial change in circumstances from 
those present and envisioned at the time the Decree was entered. 
In addition, the interference is an act totally inconsistent with 
the best interests of the children. As this Court noted in Smith, 
such actions raise a significant probability that Ms. Sigg is unfit 
to act as the custodial parent. The trial court so concluded. 
Ms. Sigg places great weight on the case of Cummings v. 
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). Her reliance is, 
however, misplaced. In Cummings, this Court noted: 
The testimony presents instances of bickering about 
the exact time the children should be picked up and 
returned. There is evidence that both parties 
became upset over time differences of even one 
hour. Again, there is no explanation of how these 
disputes over visitation impact the parenting 
ability of [the former custodial parent]. 
Id. at 477. 
The instant case is remarkably different. Mr. and Ms. Sigg 
were not merely bickering about the pick up and return time for 
visitation. Ms. Sigg, assisted by her parents and her live-in 
boyfriend, were all deliberately attempting to preclude Mr. Sigg 
from having any contact with the minor children. Ms. Sigg left the 
State of Utah and traveled to Colorado and then to New Zealand with 
the minor children without informing Mr. Sigg. When Mr. Sigg 
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finally tracked her down in New Zealand, Ms. Sigg and her parents 
continued to secret the children. Notwithstanding the Decree which 
Ms. Sigg ignored, Mr. Sigg was allowed only two hours of visitation 
during five weeks while he was in New Zealand. His visitation was 
"supervised" by Ms. Sigg's father which arrangement Mr. Sigg 
neither sought nor agreed to but which Ms. Sigg both unilaterally 
and without any authority imposed. Mr. Sigg had to commence court 
proceedings in New Zealand in an attempt to secure any visitation 
with his children. 
Ms. Sigg returned to Colorado and essentially cutoff all 
telephone, mail and physical visitation with the minor children. 
After not having seen the children for months and not being able to 
communicate with them except through a telephone answering machine, 
Mr. Sigg was lured by Ms. Sigg to Boulder, Colorado to pick-up the 
children for a long-awaited holiday visitation period. Rather than 
seeing and visiting with his children, Mr. Sigg was promptly 
arrested on a trumped-up charge of telephone harassment concocted 
by Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes. Such acts are not merely bickering 
about visitation times but justify a per se finding by the trial 
court that Ms. Sigg is unfit to act as the custodial parent. 
The interference with the visitation rights of Mr. Sigg to the 
extent present in this case, constitutes a substantial change in 
circumstances and a compelling reason for modification of the 
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Decree based on the best interests of the minor children. It 
cannot be reasonably disputed that the best interests of the minor 
children will be promoted by having a relationship with both 
parents. Mr. Sigg has fostered and will foster the relationship 
between Ms. Sigg and the children by promoting visitation. 
Unfortunately, the reverse has not and will not be the case if Ms. 
Sigg had remained as the custodial parent. Both her actions and 
words have made Ms. Sigg's intentions clear. She will do 
everything in her power to block, restrict and deny visitation. 
Dr. Stewart, a well-respected psychologist and custody 
evaluator, made an extensive investigation and review in this case. 
Dr. Stewart considered all the factors which must be considered 
under Utah law.4 Dr. Stewart concluded and recommended to the 
trial court that it is in the best interest of the parties' minor 
children that Mr. Sigg serve as the custodial parent. 
Similarly, the trial court, in two full days of trial, 
including the extensive cross-examination of Dr. Stewart, 
considered her recommendation and the other evidence presented both 
supporting and opposing a change in custody. There was 
overwhelming evidence to justify the decision of the trial court. 
The facts of this case and the law mandate the action the trial 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1994) and Rule 4-903 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
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court took. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court to modify 
the custody award should be affirmed. 
II. 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS IS MANDATED IN THIS CASE 
The trial court found it equitable, given the egregious 
conduct of Ms. Sigg in interfering with Mr. Sigg's visitation 
rights, that Ms. Sigg pay a portion of the fees and costs incurred 
by Mr. Sigg in his attempt to maintain a relationship with his 
children. The statement of the facts section of this brief and the 
record in this case detail the actions taken by Ms. Sigg and need 
not be reiterated here. Ms. Sigg now has the audacity to claim 
lf[t]here has been no violation by Carolyne Sigg of the visitation 
rights granted to Henry Sigg under the Decree of Divorce." Brief 
of Appellant at 37. The facts establish otherwise. 
Ms. Sigg argues in her brief there is no statutory or common 
law basis for an award of attorneys1 fees and costs. That 
proposition is incorrect. As to statutory law, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-32-12.2 (1994) permits a trial court to impose various 
sanctions to enforce a visitation order including an award of 
"actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs to the 
prevailing party." Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12.2(3)(a). 
22 
Similarly, Utah case law clearly establishes that an award of 
attorneys1 fees and costs is appropriate in visitation interference 
cases. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) 
Where a court awards attorney fees incurred by one 
party seeking to enforce a court order, a court may 
disregard the financial need of the moving party. 
Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1981) 
(attorney fees affirmed absent evidence of need 
where one spouse had to bring three proceedings to 
compel other spouse to comply with provision of 
decree); Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 
650, 652 (1952) ("There can be no doubt that 
attorney's fees are allowable in actions of this 
type."); Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213, 
216 (1921) (court has discretion to award attorney 
fees in proceeding to enforce provisions of decree 
"whether for contempt or otherwise"); Lyngle v. 
Lyngle, 831 P. 2d 1027, 1030 & n. 4 (Utah App. 1992) 
(in action to enforce its own orders, court has 
discretion to award attorney fees.) 
Id. 850. 
It must be noted that the trial court did not award Mr. Sigg 
any amount associated with (1) his travel to and stay in New 
Zealand; (2) fees and costs incurred for a private investigator, 
attorney and mediator while in New Zealand; or (3) fees and costs 
relative to the filing of the First and Second Petitions by Mr. 
Sigg's prior counsel. These costs and fees total in excess of 
$10,900.00, all of which Mr. Sigg has had to personally pay. See 
Defendant's Exhibit 3. 
The trial court did award Mr. Sigg (1) $14,302.48 representing 
a portion of the attorneys' fees and costs incurred for his current 
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counsel; (2) fees paid by Mr. Sigg to Dr. Stewart for the custody 
evaluation in the amount of $2,683.34; (3) the out-of-pocket costs 
of Mr. Sigg in the amount of $310.00 relative to the Boulder, 
Colorado incident; and (4) the amount of $1,000.00 as attorneys' 
fees and costs relative to the defense of the Colorado criminal 
action. 
Ms. Sigg's malicious conduct required Mr. Sigg to also take 
drastic and expensive steps. The trial court determined it to be 
equitable that Ms. Sigg be monetarily responsible for a portion of 
the damage she has caused. Accordingly, the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
CHILD CARE COSTS IS EQUITABLE 
Ms. Sigg next argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in the allocation of responsibility for the child care 
costs incurred for the benefit of the minor children. The trial 
court ordered that Ms. Sigg be solely responsible for one-third of 
the day care costs incurred prior to May 1993 and that the parties 
be equally responsible for the balance. Additionally, the trial 
court ordered that the parties be equally responsible for day care 
costs incurred after April 1993. 
Ms. Sigg fails completely to marshall the evidence with 
respect to this issue. Prior to May 1993, Ms. Sigg worked for Mr. 
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Haynes for approximately 14 months. Ms. Sigg assisted Mr. Haynes 
in various aspects of his business including arranging 
appointments, telephone and mail sales solicitation, arrangement 
for trade shows, filing sales orders and similar activities. All 
of these activities were conducted from the residence. T. 304-7. 
During normal school hours, the parties' oldest minor daughter was, 
in fact, attending school. The parties youngest minor daughter 
could have been at home with Ms. Sigg had Ms. Sigg not determined 
to ship her off to day care. 
Ms. Sigg's claim for reimbursement of child care costs also 
represents an extreme example of Ms. Sigg attempting to preclude 
Mr. Sigg's contact with the children. Such occurred when Ms. Sigg 
attended a trade show with Mr. Haynes for approximately ten days. 
Rather than taking the children to Mr. Sigg or having Mr. Sigg come 
to Colorado to care for the children, either of which Mr. Sigg 
would have done, Ms. Sigg flew in a friend, Margaret Braae, from 
Park City, Utah to Boulder, Colorado to tend the children. Ms. 
Sigg claimed at trial that Mr. Sigg should pay one-half of the day 
care costs. T. 307. 
It is certainly true that it was more convenient for Ms. Sigg 
to have certain uninterrupted time without the children to fulfill 
her employment duties. However, Ms. Sigg's employer and boy 
friend, Mr. Haynes, was extremely accommodating to her desires and 
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Ms. Sigg could have easily arranged her schedule to complete her 
parenting duties as well as fulfill her employment responsibilities 
without the need of surrogate care for the minor children. The 
trial court so found in its ruling: 
The Court finds as to the day care costs that the 
day care costs were not all incurred as a 
legitimate cost of day care for caring for the 
children while the mother was otherwise working, 
that many of the decisions in relation to the day 
care costs were really not necessary even though I 
recognize that she could not work as fully out of a 
home with the child present as she might be engaged 
without the child being present. Now I have no 
great basis to determine upon which, how much of 
this should or should not be allowed, and so I'm 
going to make a decision that one-third of the 
amount is to be the mother's costs solely, and the 
parties are to divide the remainder. Now, of 
course, I'm excluding from that the Margaret Braae 
cost which I think was inappropriate to be 
requested and was deleted by the plaintiff in her 
own testimony. 
Judge's Ruling, at 6-7 (R. 660). 
Subsequent to April 1994, Ms. Sigg obtained employment outside 
the home. Given employment outside the home, day care costs 
incurred for periods while the children were not in school is 
certainly appropriate. Mr. Sigg stands ready to pay one-half of 
the reasonable amounts incurred for those day care costs. 
The trial court equitably exercised its discretion and ordered 
the allocation of child care costs as indicated above. Such did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed. 
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IV. 
MS. SIGG'S COHABITATION CONSTITUTES GROUNDS 
FOR TERMINATION OF HER ALIMONY AWARD 
The law to be applied and the facts in this case on the issue 
of cohabitation are clear. In fact, Ms. Sigg admits that she and 
Mr. Haynes began cohabiting no later than August 1993. The only 
issue on appeal is when the cohabitation commenced. The trial 
court found that cohabitation commenced no later than February 
1993. That decision should be affirmed. 
A. Cohabitation Is Well-Defined Under Utah Law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6) provides: 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. 
However, if it is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, payment 
of alimony shall resume. 
The term "residing" is not defined in the statute. 
In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P. 2d 669 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
. . . there are two key elements to be considered 
in determining whether [a person is] cohabitating 
with [another]: common residency and sexual contact 
evidencing a conjugal association. . . . common 
residency means the sharing of a common abode that 
both parties consider their principal domicile for 
more than a temporary or brief period of time. 
Sexual contact means participation in a relatively 
permanent sexual relationship akin to that 
generally existing between husband and wife. 
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Id. at 672. 
B. Ms. Sigg And Mr. Hayes Cohabitated No Later Then February 
1993. 
Ms. Sigg vainly attempts to argue that she and Mr. Haynes did 
not begin to cohabit until August 1993. Ms. Sigg attacks findings 
nos. 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 by arguing that the record does not 
support those findings. In marshalling the evidence in her brief, 
Ms. Sigg gives a summary of the trial testimony, at least from her 
perspective, on the issue of cohabitation. Brief of Appellant at 
42-43. Even that summary, however, supports a determination of 
cohabitation. The trial testimony is clear that: 
1. Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes resided together for 
approximately one week in August 1992 in Colorado; two weeks in 
December 1992-January 1993 in New Zealand; continuously after 
February 1993 in Colorado either in the same condominium or in 
condominiums that were within a few doors of each other; and, of 
course, they resided in the same residence after August 1993. 
2. Beginning in February 1993, Ms. Sigg and the minor 
children moved in with, ate, slept and otherwise lived with Mr. 
Haynes in his condominium. T. 227-8, 255-6 
3. Mr. Haynes "essentially slept with the children's 
mother every night." T. 227-8, 232. 
4. In an attempt to hide the cohabitation from Mr. 
Sigg, Ms. Sigg rented another condominium in the same complex. The 
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use of two residences is an oft-times used ploy of those 
cohabiting. But even with the use of two residences Ms. Sigg and 
the minor children continued to eat with Mr. Haynes; Ms. Sigg and 
Mr. Haynes slept together and had sexual intercourse; Ms. Sigg and 
Mr. Haynes had free access to or a key to each condominium; Ms. 
Sigg and Mr. Haynes shared living expenses; Mr. Sigg was required 
to place telephone calls for telephone visitation with the minor 
children to Mr. Haynes1 business number at the condominium; Ms. 
Sigg and Mr. Haynes maintained certain clothing in each 
condominium; the furniture in both condominiums was used by Mr. 
Haynes and Ms. Sigg. T. 222-235. 
5. After attempting to unsuccessfully hide the 
cohabitation from Mr. Sigg for several months, Ms. Sigg and Mr. 
Haynes eventually determined to jointly purchase a residence. They 
moved into the residence in August 1993. Certainly the decision to 
jointly purchase, pay for and reside in the residence must have 
been made months earlier and also clearly evidences an intent of 
Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes to reside together. 
In summary, the overwhelming evidence in this case supports 
the trial court's finding that Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes began 
cohabitating in February 1993. Accordingly, it was appropriate for 
the trial court to enter an order terminating alimony as of 
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February 1993. Similarly, it is appropriate that Mr. Sigg receive 
a credit of $1,000.00 for the alimony he paid thereafter. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MS. 
SIGG'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL 
Ms. Sigg writes only eleven lines at the end of her brief to 
argue that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to deny her 
Motion for Continuance of Trial. Notwithstanding the fact that 
brevity in a brief is to be heralded, the length of Ms. Sigg's 
argument speaks volumes as to the merit even Ms. Sigg places on her 
position. 
The trial of this action was scheduled to begin on Tuesday, 
June 14, 1994. Dr. Stewart had not completed her evaluation by 
Monday, June 6, 1994. Counsel for both parties contacted Dr. 
Stewart and were informed that the evaluation would be completed as 
quickly as possible but that the completion of the evaluation was 
being delayed because Dr. Stewart was having difficulty in 
contacting certain persons named by the parties as collateral 
sources of information. During the week of June 6, 1994, counsel 
for both parties maintained day-to-day contact with Dr. Stewart's 
office relative to the completion of the evaluation. 
Ms. Sigg filed her Motion for Continuance of Trial on 
Thursday, June 9, 1994. Even though her written report had not 
been released, Dr. Stewart contacted counsel for the parties by 
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telephone on Friday, June 10, 1994, and in a conference lasting 
approximately 30 minutes summarized her recommendation and answered 
the questions counsel raised at that time. Dr. Stewart offered to 
make herself available over the weekend to discuss the 
recommendation with either party or their counsel. 
The timing of Dr. Stewart's release of her evaluation was not 
prejudicial to either party. Prior to trial, both parties had the 
right and more than adequate time to conduct discovery, retain 
expert witnesses and otherwise prepare for trial. The release date 
by Dr. Stewart of her evaluation had no bearing on the ability of 
either party to adequately prepare for trial. Assuming arguendo 
that the release date of the evaluation was prejudicial, that 
prejudice applied equally to both parties because neither party 
knew what Dr. Stewart's recommendation would be until her report 
was actually released. 
Pursuant to Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
lf[t]rial courts have substantial discretion in deciding whether to 
grant continuances . . . and that decision will be reversed only if 
the judge has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably." 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). The trial 
court did not abuse its "substantial discretion" in denying the 
continuance for the reasons stated above. 
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Ms. Sigg's reliance on the case of Yates v. Superior Court, 
586 P. 2d 997 (Ariz. App. 1978) is misplaced. In Yates, the 
plaintiff filed a motion for continuance two weeks prior to a 
prelitigation review panel hearing as soon as it was learned that 
her medical expert, whose testimony was essential to her claim, 
would not be available on the hearing date. The appellate court 
ruled that the continuance should have been granted in that the 
inconvenience caused by the delay was completely overshadowed by 
the fact that the plaintiff would be foreclosed from having her 
claim considered by the panel on its merits and would be placed at 
a disadvantage in subsequent litigation. In this case, however, 
Dr. Stewart appeared, testified and was cross-examined at length at 
trial. 
In summary, the trial court properly denied Ms. Sigg's Motion 
for Continuance of Trial. The denial of the Motion did not 
constitute prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the trial court as 
found in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its 
Amended Decree of Divorce should be affirmed in all respects. Mr. 
Sigg should also be awarded his attorneys1 fees and costs on 
appeal. 
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Sigg v. Sigg 
No. 10482 
History 
Mr. and Mrs. Sigg met in Switzerland where they were both 
working. They lived together for about a year. When Mr. Sigg went 
to London Mrs. Sigg followed him and then on to New York where they 
visited his parents for a month. They were interested in finding 
a place that attracted them and did some library research which 
stimulated his interest in going to Boise and her interest in going 
to Santa Fe. Instead they stopped to see some high school friends 
for the ski season in Park City and decided to stay. They married 
in 1984. 
Mrs. Sigg reports that Mr. Sigg always wanted to get married 
but she was not so sure since she didn't want to stay in the United 
States. However/ they had been together for four years and she was 
pregnant at the time which was the deciding factor for her 
marriage. The marriage went well with her at first but began to 
have problems in 1986 or 1987 when Mr. Sigg frequently went to New 
Jersey as an acquisition director for the Pyramid Construction, a 
family business. She reports that Mr. Sigg started behaving 
differently toward her during this time and that he seemed to be 
emotionally unstable, aggressive, and verbally abusive. She was 
not happy with the relationship and their intimate relationships 
decreased* 
Prom Mrs. Sigg's point of view there were two precipitating 
factors involved in the divorce. The first was her suspicion that 
Mr. Sigg was heavily into drugs which affected his lifestyle. She 
was always very much opposed to drugs. She knew that some of his 
friends were into drugs, that the people with whom he was friendly 
were drug abusers and the places he went were frequented by drug 
abusers. She did not feel comfortable with his friends and they 
did not feel comfortable with her. She had seen Mr. Sigg use some 
marijuana and saw him take cocaine on two occasions, once before 
Nicola was born and once afterwards. Other than that she inferred 
his drug usage from his behavior. 
The second precipitating factor in the divorce was what she 
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described as his aggressive and abusive behavior. Mrs. Sigg wanted 
Mr. Sigg to get help but he denied having a problem that needed 
help. They saw Dr. Zemlick in May of 1989 for two or three 
sessions together but Mr. Sigg discontinued because he felt they 
were making no progress. Mrs. Sigg continued for several more 
sessions until December of 1990. Dr. Zemlick saw five year old 
Nicola a couple times and noted Nicki's report of tension and fear 
that she would not be able to live with her mother. Dr. Zemlick 
reported that Mr. Sigg was basically healthy but confused and 
angry. Dr. Zemlick encouraged Mrs. Sigg to file assault and 
battery charges against Mr* Sigg and to get a restraining order. 
Mrs. Sigg filed for divorce in late 1989. They reconciled for 
about six months before she filed again and obtained a restraining 
order after he became physically abusive. The divorce was final in 
early 1991. They agreed that the children should be in Mrs. Sigg's 
custody. The parties contemplated that Mrs. Sigg might visit New 
Zealand and the visitation plan made provisions for 60 days of 
visitation if she were out of the country or out of Utah so that 
visits on alternate weekends and on Tuesday and Thursday from 4-
8;00 p.m. were not possible. There was no provisions made, 
however, for holidays or for visits if Mr. Sigg traveled to her . 
Mrs. Sigg met Victor Haynes in August of 1991 and saw him 
regularly at about two week intervals when he visited Park City on 
business or when she visited him in Boulder, Colorado. After the 
divorce Mrs. Sigg and the children lived in the £ami]y home. 
During that time visitation worked out reasonably well since the 
Siggs lived about a mile from each other. However, Mrs. Sigg was 
annoyed that Mr. Sigg was frequently late in picking up the 
children or in returning them. The midweek visits were scheduled 
from 4:00-8:00 p.m. She reports that sometimes he did not pick 
them up until nearly 5:00 and often returned them at 8:30 and on 
one occasion returned them at 10:30 on a school night at which time 
she called the police. She reported that he never called the 
children between visits while she lived in Park City* However, it 
should be noted that since Mr. sigg saw the children eight evenings 
and four full days during the month/ not calling the girls (who 
were ages 6 and 3) was not indicative of lack of interest in them. 
Mr. Sigg had been seeing Amy Wilking since shortly after 
Lindsay's birth in June of 1989. Amy and her husband, Jan, had 
been friends of the Siggs over the years. The demise of the 
Wilking marriage was not unexpected nor was it pleasant for Mr. or 
Mrs. Wilking. However, both parties recognized that each would be 
better off if not married to the other and divorce was the best 
thing for them. They agreed upon joint custody of their daughter 
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Katie who at that time was about lour years old. Katie has lived 
with her mother but the Wilkings have a comfortable, unstructured 
relationship and live close by each other so that visits by Katie 
with each of her parents have been easily arranged and there is 
open communication and no stress. 
During 1992 Mr. Sigg had the children for three weeks during 
the month of May and for a little over a month during the summer 
and returned them a little early so Mrs. Sigg could take the 
children to Disneyland and stay with friends nearby. About that 
time Mrs* Bigg sold her home and made plans to leave Park City 
permanently because she did not like living so close to Mr* Sigg. 
She wanted time to decide what she should do with her future. She 
was afraid to tell Mr. Sigg while she was still in Park City of her 
plans to leave nor did she put her plans in writing or communicate 
through her attorney regarding her planned departure to New Zealand 
for an indefinite period. She left not telling Mr. Sigg that she 
was leaving Park City permanently and going to New Zealand nor did 
she make any arrangements for the children to visit with their 
father when she was out of state. When Mr. Sigg heard that her 
house had been sold and her telephone disconnected, he called Mr. 
Haynes who informed him that Mrs. Sigg had left for New Zealand 
permanently. 
Mrs. Sigg's and Mr. Haynes' relationship had become more 
serious during the 1991-1992 period. Mr. Haynes recalled that when 
Mrs. Sigg left Park City for New Zealand in September of 1992 he 
thought they might get together for a fall visit in New Zealand. 
Mr. Haynes also thought that Mrs. Sigg had called Mr. Sigg from a 
friend's house in California telling him that she was leaving for 
New Zealand and not from Park City, so as to avoid Mr. Sigg's anger 
about her leaving with the children. Mr. Haynes encouraged Mrs. 
Sigg to go ahead to New Zealand. Their marriage plans remained 
indefinite because Mr. Haynes felt that the "disturbances11 between 
Mr. and Mrs. Sigg might be too much of a strain between him and 
Mrs. Sigg. 
After she arrived in New Zealand Mr. Sigg's phone calls to 
Mrs. Sigg's mother's house were not accepted. It was made clear 
that he was not welcome there and that Mrs. Sigg's address and 
phone number were not available. Mrs. Sigg stayed for a while with 
her parents then moved to a friend's house. 
Mr. Sigg was very angry for her no-notice departure and was 
especially angry about not having any arrangements made for 
visiting with or contacting the girls. He notified Mrs. Sigg in 
September that he was traveling to New Zealand to see the girls. 
After arriving and not being able to locate them he hired a private 
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investigator to find them# retained an attorney, and sent at least 
one letter to a school requesting information about Nicola's 
possible enrollment. He was very angry; she was frightened and 
also very angry. 
Mrs. Sigg had made no plans for the children to visit their 
father after leaving Park City because he had had all of the sixty 
days of visits for 1992 specified in the Decree of Divorce for 
situations when she was out of the state of Utah* The problem for 
Mr. Sigg was that e had not been alerted earlier that he would not 
got any visits with the children after her departure in the fall of 
1992. He was angry that she rejected his requests for visits with 
the children in New Zealand and her failure to recognize the 
importance to the children and to him of spending some of the 
holidays with them. 
Mrs. Sigg maintains that the girls called Mr. Sigg when they 
arrived in New Zealand about twice a month and that he also called 
them about twice a month. There is some question about this 
inasmuch as Mrs. Sigg's mother screened Mr. Sigg's calls, would not 
give out Mrs. Sigg's telephone number, and Mrs. Sigg moved to a 
friend's home after two or three weeks, leaving no number or 
address. Mrs. Sigg reported that she did not take Mr. Sigg's calls 
because she had "no right to use the phone and calls were 
expensive". 
In mid October Mr. Sigg wrote Mrs. Sigg that he was traveling 
to New Zealand to see the children. He mentioned considering 
bringing the girls back to Utah on or after December IB when the 
New Zealand schools let out for their summer vacation (mid December 
to the end of January). He hoped to negotiate a more reasonable 
visitation schedule including provisions for transportation and 
scheduling and sharing of costs for traveling long distances. He 
also hoped to avoid court action but was prepared to pursue legal 
action alleging interference while pursuing relief under the Hague 
Treaty. Mrs. Sigg proposed mediation of the matter and retained a 
mediator but Mr. Sigg was angry at what he considered to be her 
highhandedness. It was difficult to mediate when he was still 
angry about her leaving without telling him and then concealing her 
whereabouts. He suspected that she would retain a mediator who 
would be favorably disposed to her proposals. Mrs. Sigg reports 
that she had always found Mr. Sigg difficult to deal with during 
discussions of the differences between them because he became 
angry, verbally abusive/ and accusatory so that reasonable dialogue 
was not possible. There were four mediation sessions and one visit 
was scheduled with the girls by the mediator. The visit took place 
in a park and did not go well, partly because everyone was tense 
and angry. 
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The Sigg case was the first one heard in new Zealand under the 
Hague Treaty. The Judge reportedly ruled that Mr* Sigg'e action 
WOB premature since Mrs. Sigg had not violated the terms of the 
divorce decree inasmuch as he had visited the children for sixty 
days during the 1992 year and even on a twelve month basis, there 
was still time for sixty days of visits before she would be in 
violation• 
Mr. Sigg left Mew Zealand after the court proceedings and his 
one visit with the children. Mr. Haynes arrived for the holiday 
with Mrs. Sigg and the children shortly thereafter. 
In the fall Mrs, Sigg filed with the Office of Recovery 
Services and he was notified after he returned. Mr. Sigg filed a 
petition to modify the divorce decree while Mrs* Sigg was still in 
New Zealand. He paid the back child support (May-November of 1992) 
and asked for an acceptable visitation schedule. She wrote Mr. 
sigg about working out a schedule for everybody which would include 
use of spring breaks and long weekends* He had already requested 
such a visitation plan and was annoyed that she did not seem 
interested in cooperation until legal action was pending. 
Mrs. Sigg left New Zealand in late January of 1993 after 
Nicola's summer vacation from school and moved to Colorado where 
Mr. Haynes had his business. Nicola was enrolled in school in mid 
February. It was her fourth new school for the 1992-1993 school 
year. 
During 1993 Mr. Sigg had a visit with the children during 
their spring break from March 19 to 28/ from April 15 to 18 
<although he did not return the children until April 20), and from 
May 28 through 31 although he did not return the children until 
June 2. His month extended vacation for the summer began June 22 
and was to end August 23 although the children were actually 
returned August 28. Mrs. Sigg had one afternoon visit with them 
during that summer. Mrs* Sigg and the children lived in a 
condominium until the children left to spend two months with their 
father in Park City. Mrs. Sigg waB greatly aggravated by Mr. 
Sigg's late return of the children after some visits. From his 
point of view driving roundtrip from Park City to Boulder did not 
make sense if he had only two days so he returned them late on 
several occasions* Nicola missed six days of school that year 
which was a great concern to Mrs. Sigg although Nicola's 
performance in school did not suffer and she complained about Mr. 
Sigg not sticking strictly with the exact times of pickup and 
return. She denied a visit in March on Nicola's birthday when Mr. 
Sigg was there with presents and he was frustrated with what he 
interpreted as her arbitrary and controlling behavior. 
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In August Mrs. Sigg and Mr. Haynes bought a home together. 
The children were due back from their visit with their father on 
August 23 but they were returned five days later because Mr. Sigg 
and Amy and friends had had long standing reservations on Cape Cod 
for a two week vacation which extended until that date. Mr. Sigg 
could not send the children to Colorado alone on an airplane, was 
unable to reschedule the Cape Cod visit for an earlier date, and 
was unwilling to upset a planned vacation that included other 
people. Mrs. Sigg called the police to give a missing persons 
report on the 28th of August and informed them that Mr. Sigg was 
returning them late to aggravate her and that the police should 
hold off action until the following morning. Nicola and Lindsay 
arrived home at about 6:00 that evening. 
Mrs. Sigg did not allow any visits during the fall of 199 3 and 
did not give Mr. Sigg her phone number. Instead, calls had to be 
made to Mr. Haynes' business line and Mr. Sigg became frustrated 
and then angry when his calls met with answering machine messages 
that ran for thirty or more seconds before he could leave a 
message. After calling once or twice, getting the recorded message 
and leaving his own message; he frequently hung up on later calls 
as the answering machine began to record. Mr. Sigg got through on 
some occasions. During one call Mr. Haynes informed Mr. Sigg that 
he would not be seeing the girls and that Mr. Sigg could only speak 
to them two evenings each week at 7:00 p.m. Mr. Sigg answered Mr. 
Haynes with anger and reminded him that "what goes around comes 
around0. Mr. Sigg was frustrated because Mrs. Sigg would not 
negotiate personally and Mr. Haynes, who had no authority, was 
setting the terms of Mr. Sigg'6 communication with his children. 
Mr. Haynes and Mrs. Sigg interpreted the frequent calls and the 
hangups as harassment and on October 17, 1993 after a weekend of 
recorded phone calls from Mr. Sigg trying to arrange for a 
Thanksgiving visit while Mr. Haynes and Mrs. Sigg were not at home, 
Mr. Haynes reported to the Boulder police that he and his live-in 
girlfriend had been harassed by her ex-husband. 
By September of 1993 Mr. Sigg was angry about Mrs. Sigg's 
denial of further visits when he had returned the girls five day 
late after their summer vacation trip to Cape Cod. He was also 
angry about suggestions that he let Mr. Haynes adopt the children. 
He accused Mrs. Sigg of attempting to "work the system by not 
agreeing to cessation of alimony in spite of the fact that you have 
been cohabitatlng since March of 1993,f. He threatened to file a 
petition to modify the divorce asking the court to terminate 
alimony based upon her cohabitation if Mrs. Sigg did not 
voluntarily agree to terminate the alimony. Mrs. Sigg was offended 
partly because she denied cohabitation and also because Mr. Sigg 
and Amy wilking had not married. He accused her of trying to 
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enhance his liability for child support and alimony by the very 
nature of her divorce requirements/ i.e., asking for a fast payout 
at the time of divorce which put a squeeze on his cash flow which 
was always low during the summer time. He questioned Mrs. Sigg's 
use of child support money and her need for full daycare everyday 
since she worked at home. Both Mr. Sigg and Mrs. Sigg were 
obviously still smarting from the property settlement at the time 
of divorce. Mr* Sigg felt that Mrs. Sigg wanted too much in the 
way of ohild care cost sharing in view of the fact that she worked 
at home and he doubted that she needed the full daycare of Lindsay 
which she claimed. He also objected to picking up and dropping off 
the children in a public parking lot because it was denigrating to 
the girls. Mr. Sigg sent Mrs* Sigg a copy of Nicola's school 
schedule for the 1993-94 school year which he had obtained and 
asked to see the children for Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays 
since he had not seen them during the 1992 holiday season* He 
objected to Mrs. Sigg's position that he was not entitled to visit 
with the children until the summer of 1994. 
On December 1, 1993 Paul Reichenbach, a Boulder City police 
officer, stated in an affidavit that he had contacted victor Haynes 
on October 4/ 1993 regarding Mr. Haynes' report of ongoing 
harassment by Mrs. Sigg's ex-husband who called at all hours, 
sometimes hanging up, frequently leaving threatening messages on 
the machine some of which were obscene and were kept as evidence. 
(These calls had to do with Mr. Sigg's denial of visitation after 
he returned the girls five days late in August.) Quotations from 
the answering machine were as follows, "Vic, you can be sure I'm 
gona (sic) get a restraining order keeping you from my children for 
child molestation." "Carolyn I'm calling the mortgage company to 
tell them you are participating in loan fraud at your house.'1 
"I'll get you, you son of a bitch. You can't keep me from seeing 
my kids, I've got a right." Detective Reichenbach spoke to 
Detective Mary Ford in the Park City Police in late October of 1993 
asking her to speak to Mr. Sigg in hopes of quieting down the 
harassing telephone calls. On November 17th Mrs. Sigg informed 
Detective Reichenbach that the situation was better and that Mr. 
Haynes might officially drop the matter. The following day the 
Boulder District Attorney's office informed Detective Reichenbach 
that their office would not extradite Mr. Sjgg from Utah for the 
harassment. At that time Mr, Haynes agreed that the situation had 
improved and he no longer wanted to pursue the matter. 
During calls in November Nicola mentioned to her father that 
they would be coming for Thanksgiving. Mr. Sigg obtained a copy of 
Nicola's school schedule and on the basis of that he asked for a 
Thanksgiving visit with the children beginning the weekend before 
Nicola's school let out and continuing through the following 
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Sunday. This would have required Nicola to miss two days of 
school, November 22 and 23, and Mrs. Sigg was firmly opposed to 
that. There were no firm arrangements by letter or phone. Mr. 
Sigg was scheduled to be at hie Moab store the weekend before 
Thanksgiving and he hoped that he could pick up the girls and drive 
them back to Utah. His calls from Moab on Friday, November 19, 
were not answered nor did he get through on Saturday. After making 
twelve calls during a two hour period he gave up and returned to 
Utah angry about the lack of communication with Mrs. Sigg. Mrs. 
Bigg reports that she thought that Mr. Sigg had "dropped the balln 
and had not made any definite Thanksgiving plans. Mr. Haynes and 
Mrs. Sigg had gone away with the children that weekend and when 
they returned they found messages on Mr. Haynes' business phone. 
According to Detective Keichenbach's affidavit Mr. Haynes 
called on November 2lst saying he wished to reinstate the telephone 
harassment charges against Mr. Sigg. 
A few days after Detective Reichenbach signed his affidavit 
(December 1, 1993). Mrs. Sigg wrote to Mr. Mason, Mr. Siggfs 
attorney/ stating that efforts to resolve issues had been stalled 
and that Mr. Sigg continues threatening court action• She felt 
that she had been generous in the visitation arrangements and was 
willing to let Nicola and Lindsay visit their father in Park City 
between December 20 and 30. She requested a notarized statement 
from Mr. Sigg that he would collect the children and return them on 
those days. She also requested that airline tickets sent to her 
before December 20 since Nicola and Lindsay would not fly alone and 
offered to drive to Denver to drop them off and pick them up at the 
airport. Mr. 8igg replied that his financial condition did not 
make it feasible to travel by air to pick up the children and 
therefore he would pick up the children at 850 Linden Avenue and 
return them on December 30th. Linden Avenue was Mrs. Sigg's 
address and she objected to a pickup at her place of residence. 
She notified Mr. Mason that Mr. Sigg could pick up the children at 
the the parking lot adjacent to the Vectra Bank at Broadway and 
Alpine Avenues in Boulder, Colorado at 10:00 a.m. on December 20th 
and she expected them home at 5:00 p.m. on the 30th of December. 
She also requested specific telephone contact with the children at 
8:00 a.m. on December 21st so that she would know that the children 
arrived safely and 10:00 a.m. on December 25th and again on 
December 29th at 7:00 p.m. in order to ensure their safe arrival 
home. Mr. Sigg had objected to these "parking lot dropoffs" in his 
December 15th letter to Mrs. Sigg but had agreed to that 
arrangement as much CLB he wished to see his children and was not 
able to pay the airfare to fly over himself for two roundtrips and 
one roundtrip for the children. The Christmas visit did not take 
place since the Boulder police were notified of the arrangement and 
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Mr, Sigg was arrested at about 10:15 a.m. BB he waited to pick up 
the children at the Vectra parking lot. After his arrest while 
waiting to pick up the children he concluded that the Christmas 
visitation offered by Mrs. Sigg was a means of ensuring his arrest 
and prosecution by the Boulder police. 
Mr. Sigg was notified that he could arrange through Boulder 
Social Services to visit the children after his arrest on December 
20 for telephone harassment but he chose not to do so. 
Mr. Sigg wishes to change custody and establish a written 
visitation schedule. Mrs. Sigg wants a written schedule of 
visitation but want to retain custody. 
Elizak^ fefr B. Stewart7 Ph.D. 
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology 
EUZABP.TH B. STEWART, Ph.D.. |.1J>. 
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During the two yearns following the Sigg's separation in 
198 9 and their divorce in 1991, the pattern of visitation was 
satisfactory even though the parents were not on good terms with 
each other. Nicola and Lindsay were accustomed to their scheduled 
visits with their father on Tuesday and Thursday evenings and on 
every other weekend. However, when Mrs. Sigg left Park City in 
August of 1992 for New Zealand without notice to Mr. Sigg and 
without making arrangement for the children to see their father, 
she created a hostile atmosphere, that has put a high price on the 
children's relationship with their father. She failed to recognize 
that the children enjoyed and needed to continue regular contact 
with him and when she refused to allow visits even when Mr. Sigg 
had traveled to New Zealand she made it clear to him and the girls 
that she was not only trying to get away from Mr. Sigg for her own 
piece of mind but that she intended to separate the girls from 
contact with him/ a goal which had no justification and led to 
considerable misery for everyone. The situation was not remedied 
when she returned to the United States five months later. She 
continued her efforts to control and limit visitation as well as 
phone contact which reflected her indifference to the girls' needs 
and was based upon a presumption that she could control the 
children's relationship with their father without regard to their 
welfare. 
At the time Mrs. Sigg left for New Zealand Mr. Sigg was four 
months in arrears in child support, a situation which he attributed 
to problems with cash flow because of his payouts to Mrs. Sigg 
during the previous year. Mrs. Sigg may have used the non-payment 
of child support as a basis for justifying her restriction in 
visitation but it is unlikely that Mr. Sigg would have continued to 
withhold child support if she had not intentionally left without 
giving him notice of her plans or the time during which she 
expected to be gone. Mr. sigg was not inclined to pay child 
support when he could not locate Mr6. Sigg in New Zealand and she 
would not take# calls from him nor allow the children to have 
contact with him. After he received notice from the Office of 
Recovery Services that she had filed a claim with them in the fall 
he waB compelled to pay the money which he owed her. Even if child 
cupport may have played some part in her rationalization about 
limiting visitation, it appears that there was a much deeper and 
more important reason. She wanted Mr* Sigg out of her life and 5he 
wanted to control the terms and conditions of any contact the girls 
had with him. She continued to control visitation after her return 
from New Zealand in February of 1993 and has made telephone contact 
extremely difficult by insisting that all telephone calls be made 
through her live-in boyfriend's business phone, not permitting the 
girls to call Mr. Sigg, being present when Mr. Slgg calls the 
girls, and screening incoming calls from him* Her complaints about 
his being late in pickup and return are understandable but the 
control of telephone contact between the girls and their father 
demonstrates that there was a clear intent to interfere with the 
children's relationship with their father and that problems with 
visitation were not merely matters of scheduling or concern about 
the length of the visits. 
Because Mrs. Sigg'e action in limiting and complicating the 
visits increased the animosity between her and Mr. Sigg and 
increased the tension for the girls within her own household the 
children's relationship with their father has come at a very high 
price to everyone concerned. Furthermore, the children are not 
happy with the exclusion of their father from their lives and Mrs. 
Sigg's boyfriend, Victor Haynes, has not replaced their father in 
the parenting role. Mrs. Sigg's suggestion that Mr. Haynes adopt 
the children further demonstrated her attempt to eliminate Mr. Sigg 
from the children's lives and was totally inappropriate given the 
fact that she and Mr. Haynes have not established a marital 
relationship in which adoption would even b« feasible let alone 
desirable. 
Mrs. Sigg's reasoning about visitation and also terminating 
Mr. Sigg's parental, rights by Mr. Haynes' adoption of the children 
1B really not necessary nor even in the girls best interests and 
reflects her serious deficiencies in her reasoning and judgment. 
She is totally insensitive to the importance to children of having 
contact with their natural parents and the advantages to them as 
well as the parents of maintaining contact through regular 
visitation. Because her efforts to interfere with visitation and 
to place Mr. Sigg at a disadvantage are very clear and are not 
advantageous for the children, it appears that she is demonstrating 
considerable malicious intent in her actions and that she has 
little regard for what the children need. For this reason the 
children are having to struggle to maintain their relationship with 
their father and have been seriously burdened with conflicts which 
the mother need not to have created. 
To facilitate visits a schedule of visitation has been 
recommended in section 30-3-33 of the Utah Code. Schedules are 
preferable to the often debated, variously interpreted, and 
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frequently litigated standard of "reasonable and liberal 
visitation11 that created disputes about what was reasonable and 
liberal and who was to decide. While mutually agreed visitation 
schedules are preferable to impose schedules, sometimes parties do 
not know how much visitation is practical and helpful for the child 
and a schedule is also helpful for parties who treat visitation as 
a property right like a timeshare in the child which ie to be 
divided between the parents along with the marital assets or when 
visitation can be used as a mean6 of one party's taking advantage 
of the other. The following schedules are suggested. 
The attached individual reports, interviews and tests 
conducted during this evaluation were used in considering the 
factors listed in Rule 4-903 of the Utah Judicial Code for custody 
evaluations. This Rule includes a list of factors that must be 
considered to assure consistency in the content of evaluation 
reports. The factors are as follows: 
1. The Children's Preference. Lindsay clearly stated that 
she wanted to live with her father and gave good reasons most of 
which have to do with the fact that she does not care for Mr. 
Haynes who lives with her mother. Nicola was less definite in her 
preference and she too has some problems with Mr. Haynes. Both 
children love their natural mother and their father, are accustomed 
to being in their homes, and are accustomed to the different rules 
and lifestyles that each of their parents has. The main difference 
is that the children have established a good relationship with 
their stepmother. Amy Sigg, while their relationship with Mr. Hayes 
is not as warm and comfortable. Furthermore they feel more tension 
in their mother's home where contact with their father is strictly 
scrutinized and the girls have rules about when they can and cannot 
talk with hinu They feel much more freedom in their father's home 
where their contact and relationship with their mother is not an 
issue. Nicola has considered living in both homes and has even 
worked out her own preferred visitation schedule which she thinks 
would work out well for either parent. She is especially missed 
having her mother and father together and feels the stress of her 
mother's action in interfering with the children's contact with Mr-
Sigg very acutely* 
2. The Benefit of Keeping Sihlinas Together. The children 
should be kept togother. There is no reason to think that the 
children would benefit if they did not live together and neither 
parent believes that separating the children would be to anyone's 
advantage. 
3. The Relative Strength of the Children's Bond With Their 
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Parents, The children are closely bonded with each parent. The 
parent/child bond develops in parents who take physical and 
emotional responsibility for the welfare of the children, make 
sacrifices for them, and gladly do what is in their best interests. 
Both parents have demonstrated their interest in caring for the 
children and their attentiveness to the children- Mr* Sigg has 
made considerable sacrifices to be close to the children and was 
even willing to sell his businesses and juove to their domicile if 
necessary in order to be with the children. Children's bonds with 
their parents develop when the childruu discover that they can 
trust their parents and that they are safe, loved, and cared for. 
The children have developed their bond with their parents and in 
this respect there is no difference in bonding between parents 
except for the tension which Mrs. Sigg has created because of 
limiting or controlling the children's contact with their father. 
4. The General Interest and Continuing Previously Determined 
custody Arrangement Where the Children are Happy and Well-Adiusted. 
The children are not happy with the angry disputes between the 
parents and specifically they are not happy with the restrictions 
on visitation with their father that have been imposed upon them. 
Lindsay and to a lesser extent Nicola is not happy with Mr. Haynes 
being in their household during the past fifteen months. His 
presence and the problems with visiting their father and stepmother 
have become of increasing concern to the children and give them sad 
feelings. The custody arrangements seemed to work well during the 
first fifteen months after divorce but has deteriorated steadily 
since Mrs. Sigg departed with the children to New Zealand and has 
failed to facilitate visitation with the children except on her 
terms which are not in their best interests. 
5. Factors Relating to the Parents' Character and Statue and 
Their Capacity or Willingness to Function as Parents. This factor, 
taken from Hutchison v. Hutchison, which dealt with the custody by 
non-parents is not entirely applicable to custody by natural 
parents, especially where both parents by virtue of their contest 
for custody have demonstrated a willingness for custody* 
Furthermore their status of natural parents is different from the 
status of non-parents in terms of a reasonable interest in custody. 
As to character and capacity for custody, both parents have 
good character in the general sense and both have the capacity to 
provide good parenting• As to moral character, both parents and 
stepparents have engaged in live-in relationships for extended 
periods of time but the relationship have been monogamous at the 
time and not socially disruptive or irresponsible. Carolyn Sigg 
accuses Amy Sigg of being immoral because she has been married 
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twice before marrying Mr* Sigg, However, Carolyn Sigg, while 
having been married only once, has had more years of live-in 
relationships (eight with Henry Sigg and one with Vic Haynes) than 
has Amy Sigg who lived for a while with each of her husbands before 
marriage but whose collective live-in time has been considerably 
less than has Mrs. Siggs. Amy Sigg has a difficult time 
understanding why a woman would live with a man purely for business 
reasons as Mrs. Sigg claims she does with Mr* Kaynes and perhaps 
with Mr. Sigg whom she insists did not want to marry and would not 
have done so had ehe not been pregnant with Nicola. 
Mrs. Sigg wanted to marry while Carolyn Sigg did not want to 
marry. Mr. Sigg always wanted to be married until hits marital 
relationship with Carolyn deteriorated and he- and Amy began an 
affair prior to his divorce from Carolyn. It is difficult to find 
any real problem with moral character with adults but there is a 
problem with Mrs. Sigg's reluctance to make emotional commitments. 
Not only did she work and live with Mr. Sigg for eight years and 
still not to marry him she has also lived with Mr. Haynesf bought 
a house with him because it was convenient as an investment and for 
the girls, but has indicated that their relationship has fluctuated 
between a personal and a business one lor some time. For Amy Sigg 
it would have been impossible to live with someone just for the 
business and social advantages if there was not a strong love 
interest. In this respect, while not immoral, Mrs. Sigg does have 
a cool if not reserved attitude toward marriage that may continue 
to deter her interest in marriage and leave the children without an 
example of parental commitment to each other. 
A. Emotional Stability, AS for emotional stability all 
of the adults have stable personalities and their general 
style of behavior is consistent and thus predictable. Mr. 
Sigg is excitable, emotionally and behaviorally spontaneous, 
and competitive. Amy Sigg is emotionally spontaneous, 
empathetic, and emotionally attached to people. Carolyn Sigg 
is precise, emotionally distant, and not inclined to deal with 
problems directly. Mr. Haynes is competitive, reserved, 
emotionally distant, and unlikely to make commitments that 
require much personal sacrifice for the benefit of others. As 
a custodial parent, Mrs. Sigg's Inability to deal directly and 
effectively with conflict is a serious problem because it 
propels her to look for others to speak for her and to shield 
her from the kind of confrontations that custodial parents 
must handle. 
D. Duration and Depth of Desire for Custody. This 
factor, also taken from Hutchison v. Hutchison, developed in 
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the context of non-parent relationships with children and 
how long they have been established. Natural parents less 
frequently have late occurring desires for custody and the 
depth o£ the desire is not usually suspect unless there has 
been previous irresponsible behavior or inadequate parenting* 
in the Sigg case, Mr. Sigg agreed to Mrs. Sigg's having 
custody, not because as she and Mr. Haynes allege that he 
had no interest in the children but because Mrs. Sigg was a 
good mother (as Mr. Sigg ie a good father) and she had been 
the primary caretaker of the children during the marriage. 
He was involved with Amy Sigg at the time, but did not have 
a household or a marital relationship in place. His current 
interest in custody is not because he challenges Mrs. Sigg's 
physical care of the children but it is based on his 
experience in having his relationship and contact with the 
children controlled by Mrs. Sigg and her efforts to exclude 
him from the children's livea. His willingness and in fact 
plans to close his businesses in Utah to move to New 
Zealand so that he could he closer to the children and visit 
them more frequently after Mrs. Sigg left Park City 
illustrates the seriousness of his interest in the children 
and the degree which he would be willing to make sacrifices 
to preserve his relationship with them. 
C. The Ability to Provide Personal Rather than Surrogate 
Care. Both natural parents work full time as does Mr. Haynes• 
Amy Sigg works part time during the day in Mr. Sigg's stores 
and two nights a week at Miludies Restaurant. She has more 
discretionary time to be with the children after school hours 
and she and Mr. Sigg are able to be with the children in the 
evening as are Mrs. Sigg and Mr. Haynes. Mr. Sigg has more 
flexibility because he has managers and no boss. Mrs. Sigg 
now manages a retail store but she is not an owner and she 
ie less able to use her time as she wishes for the benefit of 
the children. Mr. Haynes is not ae flexible nor is willing 
to accommodate his business and professional life to the 
girls' needs. 
D. Significant Impairment of Ability to Function as a 
Parent Through Drug Use, Excessive Drinking or other Causes. 
Carolyn 9igg alleges that Henry Sigg used drugs during her 
marriage and that this contributed to a drug oriented 
lifestyle that was partly responsible for her divorce. She 
also alleges that Amy Sigg has used drugs and has been 
hospitalized twice for drug treatment and that Mr. Sigg has 
been ordered by the court not to smoke in front of the 
children which, according to Carolyn Sigg, resulted when 
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Nicola reported that her father had "twisty cigarettes". 
However Carolyn Sigg produced no evidence to substantiate 
her claim and Any Sigg as well as her former husband, Jan 
Milking staunchly denied any drug problem. Mr. WiIking 
suggested that any allegation that Amy had been hospitalized 
for drug rehabilitation was a straight out fabrication. This 
matter was not resolved in the custody evaluation and may need 
to be addressed* 
E. Reasons for Having Relinquished Custody in the Past, 
This factor, also taken from Hutchison v. Hutchisonf refers to 
the reason for relinquishing custody in the case of natural 
parents who gave up custody to non-parents and is not 
applicable in this case.. Neither parent has ever relinquished 
custody. Mr* Sigg agreed to Mrs. Sigg's having custody but 
did not indicate any lack of interest in this role. 
F. Religious Compatibility with the Children. The 
children have not been raised in the context of a strong 
religious affiliation. Amy Sigg claims that Carolyn Sigg 
resented the children accompanying Amy to the community 
church and also resented the children saying prayers at 
bedtime out loud with Amy. This was not confirmed with the 
children. Mrs. Sigg claimed no concern about religious 
compatibility during the evaluation. 
G. Kinship. This factor, also taken from the Hutchison 
v. Hutchison case involving custody by non-parents is not 
applicable when there is no issue of kinship in contesting 
natural parents* 
il. Financial Condition. This factor, also taken from 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, applies primarily when child support 
is not available ae in the case of non-parent custodians. 
In the case of natural parents, the child support guidelines 
will apply. In the Sigg case Mr. Sigg has a greater potential 
for financial support of the children with or without the 
contribution of Mrs. Sigg while Mrs. Sigg's income potential 
at the present time does not approach that of Mr. Siggs. 
6. Other Factors Important in this Case which Includes 
Consideration of Which Parent is Most Llkelv to Act in the Best 
interests of the Children, Including Allowing them to Frequent and 
Continuing Contact with the Noncustodial Parent. This factor, 
explicitly stated in section 30-3-10(2) of the Utah Code recognizes 
an overriding interest in maintaining relationshipe with the non-
custodial parent. 
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(a) The past conduct of the parents is explicitly set out in 
section 30-3-10(1). Mr. Sigg is quick to anger and during the 
latter part of hie marriage to Carolyn Sigg there were frequent 
fights and arguments* She also complains of seven incidences of 
physical abuse by him such as when he tripped her on one occasion 
and hit her on another but she could recall only three specific 
instances* Post divorce abuse of conduct by Mr. Sigg includes 
anger and verbal threats over the telephone in response to Carolyn 
Bigg'a provocative behavior in controlling and restricting 
visitation, withholding her telephone number, and insisting that 
Mr. Sigg'© telephone calls be screened by other people and that 
telephone contacts regarding the children are also made with other 
people rather than Carolyn Sigg. Carolyn Sigg's pattern of 
interfering with visitation rather than facilitating it and her use 
of other people in this effort has continued for at least a year 
and a half and is indicative of ongoing problems in visitation if 
she remains the custodial parent, 
(b) The demonstrated moral standards of each of the parents 
is contained in eection 30-3-10 of the Code is less of a factor in 
this case inasmuch as none of the parties conduct themselves in a 
way that causes a threat to the security or emotional or 
psycholitical stability of the children* 
(c) Another factor has to do with the involvement of the 
children in the visitation and custody dispute. CaroJyn Sigg 
shielded herself from the conflict that she has created in 
maintaining visitation with Mr. Sigg but she has exposed Nicola to 
the conflict by allowing her to read papers and letters regarding 
visitation. Thus she has protected herself but increased Nicki's 
feeling of responsibility for what has transpired. Mrs. Sigg's 
willingness to include the children in her dispute with Mr. Sigg is 
not a proper role for a custodial parent. 
Eli(4aoeth B. Stewart, Ph.D. 
Diplomats, Clinical Psychology 
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The issue of visitation should have been a very simple matter 
for the Biggs even though the original decree of divorce was silent 
on holidays and did not address the possibility of visits by Mr. 
Sigg if Mrs. Sigg left the state of Utah and he was willing to 
travel to her domicile for purposes of visitation. Mrs. Sigg's 
complaints about Mr. Sigg's occasional late pickup and return 
during the fifteen months following their divorce while she lived 
in Park City are not unusual, especially when there are such 
differences in personal styles between the parents. Mrs. Sigg is 
very precise about time and dates and attends to theses matters 
while missing the point of visitation. Mr. Sigg, on the other 
hand/ is more focused on long term relationships in which some 
deviation from precise times is not as critical as is the 
maintenance of the relationship. The way Mrs. Sigg handled 
visitation after she left Park City is an example of how not to 
handle visitation and is typical of custodial parents who interfere 
with parent/child relationships between the non-custodial parent 
and children because of lingering resentments toward the non-
custodial parent or because of a serious lack of appreciation of 
the importance of the non-custodial parent to the children and the 
responsibilities of the custodial parent to facilitate the 
relationship between the non-custodial parent and children through 
regular visits and conveyance of information about the children's 
significant school and social activities. Mrs. Sigg has failed to 
recognize that visitation is a means of promoting continuity and 
Btabxlity in the children's relationship with the non-custodial 
parent. All children need to know that they have parents who care 
for them. Children want to tell their friends that they have a mom 
and dad who cares for them and they cannot do that without 
opportunities to experience that caring. 
If Mrs. Sigg retains custody and remains outside the state of 
Utah but within commuting distance of Park City by automobile or 
plane travel of less than four hours duration, the following 
schedule based upon the Boulder Valley School District calendar 
would be recommended. School starts in late August following a 
summer visit. 
Labor Day weekend beginning at 4:00 p.m. on Friday preceding 
Labor Day and extending until Monday at 9;00 p.m. 
Fall school break either the early part of October of the 
latter part of October which will begin as soon as school is out 
until Sunday at 9:00 p.m. 
Thanksgiving Holiday beginning the day school lets out for the 
Thanksgiving holiday immediately after school is out until the 
following Sunday at 9:00 p.m. 
The second half of the Christmas vacation shall include one 
half of the days away from school plus one day for travel. 
Human Rights Day beginning when school lets out the day before 
the weekend and extending until 9:00 p.m. on the following Sunday. 
An Easter holiday beginning immediately after school on the 
day it lets out for Spring Break and extending until 9:00 p.m. the 
night before school commences. 
Memorial Day beginning after school lets out the day preceding 
the Memorial Day weekend until Monday at 9:00 p.m. 
The summer visit beginning the Saturday before Father's Day 
and extending for eight weeks. 
If Mr. Bigg has custody of the girls a similar schedule 
adjusted for the Park City school calendar would be appropriate as 
follows. 
Labor Day beginning the Friday before the holiday and 
extending until Sunday at 9:00 p.m. 
The fall school break known at U.E.A. commencing after school 
is out on the 5th of October and ending the following Sunday at 
9:00 p.m. x 
Thanksgiving weekend the day wchool is out until the following 
Sunday at 9:00 p.m. 
Second half of the Christmas holiday beginning after school 
lets out and extending until December 26. 
Human Rights Day beginning after school is out the Friday 
preceding the holiday and extending until 9:00 p.m. on the 
following Monday. 
Presidents Day beginning after school is out the preceding 
Friday until the following Monday at 9:00 p.m. 
8pring break holiday which commencing after school is out 
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preceding the holiday until Sunday, the last day of the hoJJday at 
9:00 p.nw 
The summer visit should commence the second weekend following 
the end of the school year and continue for eight weeks. 
Elizatte^h Bf Stewarts Ph.D. 
Diplomatef Clinical Psychology 
